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ABSTRACT
Fifty years after the adoption of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the illicit trade in cultural objects
endures, with harmful consequences to local communities, knowledge acquisition, and
archaeological landscapes and objects. In this article, we present a gap analysis to assess under-
performing policy and practice. We argue that a poor understanding of how the trade is organized
and operates and of how it might be regulated hinders effective policy formulation. Funding
structures which encourage short-term ad hoc research and inhibit information sharing are in part
responsible for some of the gaps. We conclude by suggesting how sustained theoretically
informed, evidence-led collaborative analyses might help reduce or mitigate these problems,






The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization’s Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Owner-
ship of Cultural Property (hereafter, the UNESCO Conven-
tion), adopted on November 14, 1970, was designed to tackle
the trade in cultural objects that are illicit in some way, be
they illegally excavated, smuggled in contravention of existing
law, or stolen from a heritage site or existing collection (Ger-
stenblith 2013; Prott 2012; O’Keefe 2017). We should empha-
size here that although the terms “cultural property” used in
the Convention and the now more usual “cultural objects”
embrace a broad and varied category of cultural productions,
in what follows we are restricting our usage to describe ancient
and/or sacred objects. The illicit trade in such objects destroys
cultural heritage, while simultaneously offering criminals
profitable opportunities for theft, smuggling, and fraud (Mack-
enzie et al. 2020). The UNESCO Convention established an
agreed-upon international policy response to this illicit trade,
introducing a series of legal and normative principles and rec-
ommendations that continue to shape national and inter-
national policy. Yet, the illicit trade persists, even thrives,
with continuing negative impact. In this paper, we discuss
why, fifty years after the adoption of the UNESCO Conven-
tion, there is still an illicit trade in cultural objects and suggest
what action might be taken to diminish it.
Our assertion of the tenacity of illicit trade is supported by
statistics reporting law enforcement seizures of cultural
objects and arrests during international Pandora operations:
in 2017, Operations Athena I and Pandora II: 41,000 cultural
objects seized, 53 people arrested, and 200 investigations
opened in operations spanning 81 countries (Europol
2018); in 2018, Operation Pandora III: 18,000 objects seized
and 59 people arrested in operations spanning 29 countries
(Europol 2019); in 2020, Operations Athena II and Pandora
IV: 19,000 cultural objects seized, together with €5.5 million
in cash, 101 people arrested, and 300 investigations opened
in operations spanning 103 countries (Interpol 2020).
While these Pandora statistics evidence the commendable
efforts law enforcement has made to confront illicit trade,
when they are viewed instead as indicators of market
strength, the results make for grim reading. Imagine these
operations as annual sampling exercises undertaken to test
the effectiveness of a clean-up campaign aimed at eliminat-
ing illicit pollutants from legitimate trade. The clean-up cam-
paign would be judged ineffectual. The staggering numbers
of cultural objects seized and the global reach of the networks
involved (103 countries) provide tangible evidence of a glo-
bal illicit trade that is prospering, not one that is well regu-
lated, under control, or on the way to eradication. The
reality is likely worse. Police, who are incentivized by various
metrics to tout seizures as evidence of successful crackdowns
in respect of transnational market-driven crimes more gen-
erally, will often privately acknowledge that the figures
behind such official announcements serve only as outline
indicators of vigorous continuing criminal trade (Mackenzie
and Hamilton-Smith 2011). In fact, the majority of all crim-
inal acts are acknowledged to comprise the so-called dark
figure of crime—they go unrecorded and unreported and
thus are not included in official statistics (Coleman andMoy-
nihan 1996). There is little reason to suspect the Pandora
statistics are an exception to this established pattern in
other illicit markets. If the reported arrests and seizures are
only the tip of a much larger dark criminal iceberg, then
the indications are that the illicit trade in cultural objects is
very poorly controlled.
The recent flurry of initiatives and actions aimed at curb-
ing looting and illicit trade during the time of the COVID-19
pandemic is confirmation that the international community
shares our opinion (Mercadier, Shiaa, and Guli 2020; Sharpe
2020; UNESCO 2020). Whenever public wellbeing is
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any
way.
CONTACT Donna Yates d.yates@maastrichtuniversity.nl Maastricht University Faculty of Law, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands.
JOURNAL OF FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY
https://doi.org/10.1080/00934690.2021.1996979
threatened by armed conflict (Brodie 2015; Davis and Mack-
enzie 2015; Greenland et al. 2019), major political or social
instability (Yates 2014), serious economic downturn (Kersel
2007; Parcak et al. 2016), or natural disaster (Yates and
Mackenzie 2018), some people turn to looting cultural
objects, thereby offering fertile opportunities for the financial
predation of criminals, terrorists, and other armed non-state
actors (ANSAs). Cultural heritage is always vulnerable. We
believe the reason for poorly controlled illicit trade is ill-
informed, unrealistic, or unenforceable international policy.
Here, we understand policy to be the process of deciding
what actions would work best to regulate the trade in cultural
objects to bring the illicit trade under control. When exam-
ined closely, the fabric of international policy is a thing of
gaps, reactions, and piecemeal patches, knit together by the
enduring threads of the UNESCO Convention. While there
are areas of policy success, including improved museum
acquisition policies and more efficient interagency
cooperation (Prott 2012, 3; Torggler et al. 2014, 11), there
are also clear shortfalls (see also Tsirogiannis [2021, 167]
on support for the establishment of a center dedicated to
research on illicit antiquities). As the Pandora statistics
demonstrate, the current regulatory tool kit aimed at redu-
cing the harmful consequences of the illicit trade in cultural
objects is underperforming.
In this paper, we look closely at the reasons for policy
underperformance and propose a pathway for diminishing
or resolving identified inadequacies. Before proceeding, a
few words on the scope of the paper are necessary. Elsewhere,
we have all discussed the shortcomings of present policy
aimed at curbing illicit trade; thus, we do not repeat the cri-
tique here (Brodie 2015; Yates 2015). Nor are we attempting
to provide a coherent theoretical discussion of issues sur-
rounding illicit trade, as we have also tackled this (Mackenzie
et al. 2020). To recap, briefly: our focus is on demand. It is a
criminological truism that “never in history has there been a
black market defeated from the supply side” (Naylor 2002,
11). Almost 30 years ago, Rick Elia pointed to the decisive
role of demand in looting and trafficking when he pro-
nounced that “collectors are the real looters” (Elia 1993),
reinforcing Joseph Alsop’s even earlier observation that
“the art collecting-art history interaction has been the funda-
mental one in every art market the world has ever seen”
(Alsop 1982, 139). Yet despite this cross-disciplinary consen-
sus, international policy remains resolutely aimed at protect-
ing cultural sites at source and disrupting supply-chains,
while doing very little to reduce market demand through
strong punitive, deterrent, or dissuasive actions against the
malfeasant dealers, collectors, restorers, academics, and
curators that comprise it.
We are uncomfortably aware that in recent years, most
policy-oriented scholarship has been focused upon docu-
menting the damage caused to cultural heritage at source
or describing the social and cultural worlds of in-country
actors who are engaging in trade or harmed by it. There
has been very little comparable work on the actions of collec-
tors or dealers in our own home countries or on the failures
of our governments and other institutions (including univer-
sities) to address the issue. This lack of reflexivity is concern-
ing, particularly considering the well-documented scholarly
propensity for othering (Said 1978; Fabian 1983). Aiming
research and recommendations at countries suffering harm
implicitly or explicitly projects liabilities of causation and
associations of blame. It is disconcerting that terms such as
“capacity-building” and “awareness-raising,” with their
implication that communities or countries have not yet
achieved a normative international standard, are routinely
and unquestionably deployed in policy-oriented scholarship
and in funding calls. We know from experience that sugges-
tions that capacity-building and awareness-raising might be
better aimed at the inhabitants of the Manhattan collecting
community are met with blank, uncomprehending stares.
Capacity-building and awareness-raising are for “them,”
not for “us.” Building on the work of scholars such as
James Clifford (1988), Sally Price (2001), Rick Elia (1993),
and David Gill and Christopher Chippindale (1993), along-
side the theoretical priority awarded to demand reduction,
we advocate for a more ethical stance that objectifies and
problematizes our own cultural and scholarly practices as
ultimate generators of harm.
“Public criminology” examines the variety of ways aca-
demic research on crime can interface with and promote
public discourse and progressive social policy on matters
related to crime and justice (Loader and Sparks 2010). It con-
siders things like: the receptiveness or otherwise of the politi-
cal landscape to emerging, and sometimes challenging, social
science evidence; the networks of the people involved and
how they support or diminish the prospects of evidence-
based policy; and, the ways that the internal structure of
the academic role at universities can be developed to pro-
mote external engagement and policy-facing work. Recent
projects on the illicit trade in cultural objects are good
examples of public criminology, and some have achieved sig-
nificant impact. For example, Morag Kersel’s research ident-
ified a loophole in Israel’s 1978 Antiquities Law, which
requires licensed dealers to provide an itemized registry of
their holdings (Kersel 2006). Ethnographic interviews with
dealers revealed the reuse of registry numbers after providing
vague descriptors in individual inventories. In 2016, a new
directive was enacted requiring antiquities dealers to register
their artifacts in a central digital database maintained and
monitored by the Israel Antiquities Authority (see Ben
Zion 2016). Despite the success stories, various features of
the policy assemblage make legal and practical change a
sometimes slow and difficult process.
As we see it, one of the fundamental problems facing pol-
icy making is lack of knowledge. A poor understanding of
how the trade is organized and operates and of how it
might be regulated hinders effective policy formulation.
There are other problems too, but there is beyond doubt
an urgent need for more constructive and coordinated
research into the mechanics of the trade and potential regu-
latory solutions. In the following gap analysis, we identify
what we believe to be shortfalls in present policy and policy
making and suggest how theoretically informed, evidence-
led, collaborative research might help mitigate them. The
cumulative outcome of closing the gaps would be more effec-
tive policy and reduced illicit trade (Figure 1).
Gaps and Shortfalls in Policy Making
Starting from the premise that parts of the international pol-
icy fabric are threadbare, we want to examine the policy-
making process itself. To be more precise, we want to ident-
ify potential and actual policy makers and their interactions.
There are at least six stakeholder groups with a vested
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interest in trade regulation who could provide input into pol-
icy design and implementation: 1) intergovernmental organ-
izations and international non-governmental organizations
(IGOs and INGOs; e.g. UNESCO and ICOM); 2) inter-
national law enforcement organizations (e.g. WCO, Interpol,
and Europol) and national law enforcement agencies (e.g.
Carabinieri, Guardia Civil, and FBI); 3) the private sector
(e.g. Art Loss Register and trade organizations); 4) civil
society non-governmental organizations (NGOs, e.g. The
Antiquities Coalition, Biladi, India Pride Project, and Safe-
guarding Archaeological Assets of Turkey) and other actors
(e.g. journalists); 5) national governments (and suprana-
tional customs unions); and, 6) the academy (universities
and equivalent research institutions, including some
museums). In practice, however, the form and focus of inter-
national policy is largely determined by a small number of
IGOs and INGOs (UNESCO n.d.; Torggler et al. 2014, 75–
78); there is limited involvement of other stakeholder groups.
Figure 2, for example, is taken from a public UNESCO pres-
entation in 2017 depicting UNESCO’s vision of its coordi-
nating role among international partners ICOM,
UNIDROIT, Interpol, the WCO, the European Union, and
UNODC (UNESCO 2017). Unfortunately, the IGOs and
INGOs concerned are not always best suited to research
the trade or to consider, develop, or suggest innovative pol-
icies, and it often falls outside of their mandate to do so. In
our experience, they are under-staffed, under-resourced,
and do not have the experience to conduct relevant research
into the illegal movement of cultural objects. Nor do they
have the propensity to engage with the results of emerging
research that might feed into policy making, particularly
research drawn from outside the limited field of cultural
heritage law. Rather than cultivate expert in-house research
capacity, they often hire one or more academic or private-
sector researchers on short-term consultancy contracts to
write key reports, whether or not the topic falls within the
consultant researchers’ explicit area of expertise. The ad
hoc arrangement of these short-term engagements often pro-
duces conclusions and recommendations that simply repeat
those that have been produced before by other outsourced
researchers. They pale in comparison to the deeper, more
insightful, and independent analyses that would come from
collaborative academic teams dedicated to working on
their own programs of specialized research.
In the absence of innovative research, policy formation has
become path-dependent (Klein and Marmor 2006, 902),
guided and constrained by long-established institutional
interests and inherited understandings of both trade and
regulation. Policy development builds on what is already
established or becomes a process of “patch-and-mend,”
which is not always bad, but is not conducive to new ways
of thinking or doing that might offermore to the policy reper-
toire. Compounding the problem, the involvement of several
institutions in policy making can provide a context in which
any single institutional path departure can be seriously con-
strained by the expectations of partner institutions. What
might emerge then is a kind of policy equilibrium, where bal-
ance and predictability is valued, and disruptive change is
received as unwelcome and threatening.
Thus, we are faced with a situation where policy making is
path-dependent, and the knowledge needed to inform new,
effective policy development is often unavailable, insuffi-
cient, at times unreliable, or simply repetitive, providing
few new insights. An inadequate understanding of the
trade and an unfamiliarity with innovative forms of regu-
lation combine to create questionable policy. In answer to
Prott’s (2012, 5) request, we need to remedy weaknesses
and build on strengths of presently established policy. To
do this requires coherent and cumulative research rather
than haphazard consultancy engagements. A more dedicated
commitment to the ongoing analysis of the trade and fewer
one-off reports commissioned to address specific current
events will equip policy makers with more effective data
and enable implementable programs.
Gaps and Shortfalls in Quantifying the Trade
Presently, what appear to be simple questions relating to the
size of the illicit trade cannot be answered. We require accu-
rate statistics about the size (material volume and monetary
value) of the trade and the physical damage it causes in order
to assess its harmfulness, prioritize it in terms of resource
allocation, and measure the effectiveness of any regulatory
responses. One of the first questions asked by policy makers,
Figure 1. Policy gap analysis.
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the media, and members of the public is “How much is the
trade worth?” The prevailing perception is that the destruc-
tive potential of the trade can be measured in financial terms.
A trade valued at millions of dollars annually is seen to be
more damaging and more demanding of regulation than
one valued only at thousands of dollars annually. Although
price tags have strong cultural salience, it remains true that
cultural and local loss cannot be quantified solely in monet-
ary terms. But the question of financial worth is not
altogether an irrelevant one. The monetary value of a stolen
object determines how law enforcement agencies select cases
for investigation, whether a crime is thoroughly investigated
or not, or whether a transaction is reported to tax or anti-
money laundering authorities (Gerstenblith 2007). In most
jurisdictions, the seriousness of a financial or property-
related crime is judged by the sums of money involved. If
a conviction is secured, sentencing is also reduced for
“low-value,” presumed less harmful crimes (St Hilaire
2012). There are also very real concerns about the scale of
criminal profits which feed into policy making and law
enforcement. For the international community, a multi-
million-dollar crime problem is more pressing for attention
than a multi-thousand-dollar one.
Two recent reports have produced ball-park approxi-
mations of the size of the trade (Brodie et al. 2019, 87–96;
Sargent et al. 2020, 69–85), though they are markedly impre-
cise and tinged with uncertainty. Both sampled only a small
selection of all possible cultural objects and restricted their
Figure 2. International cooperation against the illicit trade in cultural objects as presented by UNESCO (UNESCO 2017).
Figure 3. Trenches and pockmarked landscapes from looting at A) Tell Shiek Hamed, B) Tell Sura, C) Tell Swihat in Syria (photographs by Ristam Abdo), and at D)
Fifa, Jordan (photograph by Austin “Chad” Hill, courtesy of Landscapes of the Dead Project).
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data-gathering to open-source information. More accurate
and precise statistics could be obtained, but it would require
an unprecedented input of time and energy. Quantifying the
trade is not the straightforward exercise so often supposed.
In the absence of good, reliable assessments of market size,
strange and sensational numbers and claims of extreme
value start churning around in the media, prompting public
and political concern and creating demand for urgent policy
response. There is, for example, the vexatious claim that the
illicit trade in cultural objects is valued at billions of dollars
annually and ranks with drugs and arms as one of the
three most serious illicit trades (e.g. EC 2017, 10; Kouroupas
1998). The claim has been refuted many times (Brodie,
Doole, and Watson 2000, 23–25; Fitz Gibbon 2005; Brodie
et al. 2019, 78–79; Sargent et al. 2020, 84–85) but never
seems to go away (Bardon 2020, 5). Da’esh was said to be
making tens or hundreds of millions of dollars from the
trade to bankroll its activities, and the policy makers were lis-
tening (e.g. Jenrick 2015; Smith and Neubert 2015; Gramer
2017). But again, it has been impossible to verify these
figures (van Lit 2016, 63–64; Brodie et al. 2019, 113–115; Sar-
gent et al. 2020, 9–12).
Unreliable media reporting provides a treacherous foun-
dation for policy development. Any new policy initiatives
developed in an atmosphere of media hype and based on
poor-quality data are likely to fail. Not only do the mislead-
ing statistics of an insecure evidence base not support good
policy making, they also actively undermine it by allowing
the intrusion of persistent outlandish and unproven narra-
tives. Time and resources are wasted countering both the
unsupportable media claims of “extreme harm” and the
equally unsupportable trade claims of “minimal harm,”
while at the same time explaining and demonstrating why
the issue still matters despite the absence of accurate num-
bers. The true value of cultural heritage and the tangible
and intangible harms caused by the trade are lost in the
discussion.
The focus on monetary value should be complemented by
assessments of material damage. Cratered archaeological
sites (see Figure 3) and mutilated temples demand attention
in a way that the occasional looter’s hole does not. Quantitat-
ive assessments of material damage are certainly possible.
Satellite imagery is increasingly being used to quantify loot-
ing damage on the ground (Stone 2008, 2015; Contreras and
Brodie 2010; Parcak et al. 2016; Casana and Laugier 2017;
Masini and Lasaponara 2020). There are good estimates of
the potential market value of a looted site (Brodie and Con-
treras 2012; Greenland et al. 2019; Kersel and Hill 2020). But
these are not enough. There is an urgent need for additional
and sustained quantitative assessments of this type from
across the globe. Materially and visibly, they reflect the real
but less obvious losses inflicted upon communities and
societies. In effect, material damage offers a tangible indi-
cator of harder-to-measure intangible social and cultural
harms, and we should not lose sight of that fact (see Kersel
2007, 2012).
Gaps and Shortfalls in Understanding the Trade
While it is important to investigate the size of the trade and
the damage it causes, there are other major unresolved ques-
tions relating to the nature of the trade—its organization and
operation. We need to answer those questions to be able to
design more appropriate regulation and target more effective
law enforcement actions, all the while making best use of
available resources. Many existing models are based on dec-
ades-old cases that do not always reflect the realities of pre-
sent-day illicit trade. Press headlines often focus upon a trade
in monetarily expensive objects of great cultural worth, so-
called “ancient treasures” or “masterpieces,” sold at presti-
gious galleries and auction houses for the delectation of
wealthy collectors. At the high end of the trade, it is true
that objects of dubious origins are identified within and
removed from nearly every major public auction or art fair
offering ancient material (e.g. Tsirogiannis 2015; Alberge
2020; ANP 2020; Brussels Times 2020), but these objects
have not necessarily been recently stolen or looted. Many
of them have been in circulation for decades but are not
recognized until most evidence of the crime has evaporated.
That is not to say they should be left to circulate and not
recovered for their dispossessed owners, but it must be
understood that the presence of such objects on the market
is not always an indicator of present-day illicit trade. The
initial moment of harm and criminal profit might have
long since passed.
The reality now is often more mundane—a trade in small,
inexpensive objects aimed at the limited pockets of collectors
interested in relics or curios as much as treasures (though
ancient manuscripts and coins retain their cerebral appeal)
(e.g. Ilan, Dahari, and Avni 1989; Topçuoglu and Vorder-
strasse 2019). Since 2000, internet and cellular communi-
cation technologies, along with metal detectors, have
fundamentally changed the nature and scale of illicit trade
in ways that our existing policy framework does not fully
address (Brodie 2017). The internet has allowed for the cre-
ation of a nearly infinite number of storefronts for cultural
objects, across all imaginable jurisdictions, while cutting
out many of the key intermediaries that were once vital to
the functioning of this market. Platforms like Instagram
and Facebook facilitate direct communication between loo-
ters, intermediaries, and buyers (Huffer and Graham 2017;
Al-Azm and Paul 2019; Sargent et al. 2020, 52–62). Messa-
ging apps such as WhatsApp and Telegram allow secure
transactions (Moos 2020). The internet has also transformed
the types of cultural objects being marketed. Small, relatively
inexpensive, and easily portable cultural objects such as coins
currently make up the bulk of both online sales and police
seizures (Petkova 2004; Campbell 2013; Brodie 2016). On-
the-ground reporting also emphasizes the search for coins
and other small objects (Brodie and Sabrine 2018; Kersel
2019; Topçuoglu and Vorderstrasse 2019). The organization
of the trade seems to have changed along with the nature of
material traded, with more dispersed, opportunistic, and
less-specialized criminal networks coming to work alongside
the more traditionally organized high-value supply chains
headed up by well-connected dealers (Kersel 2007, 2019;
Mackenzie 2011; Campbell 2013; Mackenzie and Davis
2014; Brodie 2019a; Kersel and Hill 2019). The existing regu-
latory framework does not appropriately address low-value
but high-volume cross-jurisdictional internet transactions.
Small objects fall through the regulatory cracks or are not
even considered important enough for regulatory action.
Relevant European Union Regulations, for example, incor-
porate value judgements or thresholds that exclude low-
value objects from their control measures (EC 2008, 2019).
EU Regulation 2019/880 on the import of cultural goods,
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which is intended to control the import of cultural objects
into the European Union, was drafted with a view to redu-
cing financing extracted by terrorist groups from the illicit
trade in countries such as Syria (Brodie 2020a). It specifically
excludes coins valued at less than €18,000 EUR from any
control requirements. Yet most studies of looting and
trafficking inside Syria have emphasized the importance of
coins (Brodie and Sabrine 2018; Al-Azm and Paul 2019). If
policy makers do not have access to reliable information
about the nature of the trade, they cannot be expected to
draft an appropriate regulatory response.
There are other unanswered questions about the illicit
trade that have important ramifications for public policy
and law enforcement. Most obviously, there is the existence
of emerging markets in the Gulf states, Russia, eastern Asia,
and beyond. Referenced often, little concrete research exists
on the nature of these markets, largely because there are very
few researchers with the necessary linguistic and cultural
expertise. These markets might now comprise the major des-
tinations for high value objects, but it is hard to know for cer-
tain. How do trades in different types of material differ
materially and organizationally? Has the internet, for
example, transformed the trade of objects from south and
southeast Asia in the same way as it has the trade of objects
from the Mediterranean region? The financial aspects of the
trade remain underexamined and insufficiently understood.
There is a growing body of work looking at prices and the
determinants of prices (e.g. Beltrametti and Marrone 2016;
Brodie 2019b; Mackenzie et al. 2020, 94–114), but it is
focused on the objects being transacted, and virtually noth-
ing is known about the financing of the trade and profit mak-
ing. Important questions relating to issues of money transfer
and laundering remain unanswered. The use of cultural
objects for money laundering has been the subject of a
small number of studies (e.g. Woodman 2020), but the lim-
ited scope of this research does not reflect the increasingly
central role that financial crime investigation now plays as
a tool for law enforcement.
Scholarly research into the trade predominantly concerns
its material characteristics: what is traded, what it is worth,
and what physical damage is caused by its movement. This
focus is not surprising, given the cultural significance of
the material being traded and the fact that many researchers
are material culture specialists such as archaeologists, art his-
torians, or ancillary scholars, alongside legal researchers who
have focused on questions related to property ownership,
with an added sprinkling of criminologists. There is little
involvement of scholars with experience in researching the
socioeconomic and cultural contexts of markets, criminal
or otherwise. This lack of diverse disciplinary backgrounds
among researchers creates critical gaps in our knowledge.
Currently, there is a fundamental lack of basic interdisciplin-
ary research conducted by scholars with the necessary exper-
tise into even the most elementary aspects of the illicit trade,
which seriously hinders productive policy formation.
Gaps and Shortfalls in Legislative and Normative
Means of Regulation
While the nature and scale of illicit trade are poorly under-
stood, our comprehension of possible means of regulation
is worse. At the present time, management of the trade in
cultural objects hinges primarily on national and
international legislative efforts, informed by principles and
practices introduced by the UNESCO Convention and a sub-
sequent series of clarifying and strengthening laws and nor-
mative recommendations (Prott 2012, 3). In this way, the
UNESCO Convention has been of central importance for
the development of international public policy (O’Keefe
2017). Yet, while law enforcement might have slightly
reduced the illicit trade in cultural objects, it has not suc-
ceeded in eradicating it completely or even substantially.
The illicit trade endures. Criminals can navigate profitably
through the jurisdictional discontinuities that have devel-
oped between determinations of property ownership, sta-
tutes of limitation, concepts of good faith purchase, due
diligence, and monetary thresholds, among other issues.
One obvious problem is that the UNESCO Convention is
not self-executing, and implementations vary widely from
State Party to State Party. Some align to already existing
national law and are open to reservations (Gerstenblith
2007; Prott 2012, 4; Torggler et al. 2014, 21–34). In theory,
it would be possible to pursue more rigorous implemen-
tations, such as that achieved by Germany with its 2016 Kul-
turgutschutzgesetz (Cultural Property Protection Act). But
the art dealing lobby in many countries discourages the
adoption of what it argues to be market-restricting measures
that will damage legitimate and profitable economic activity.
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects was designed to rectify some of
the problems of the UNESCO Convention (Prott 1997),
but again, successful lobbying has prevented its adoption
by the most important market states. In these countries,
international calls to develop national policy by the adoption
or more rigorous implementation of international conven-
tions is akin to doing nothing, a lost opportunity at best,
an abdication of leadership at worst. The strengthening
and harmonization of the various implementations of inter-
national conventions and of national laws more generally is
an important long-term goal, but in the meantime, at the
national level, something more is needed. In the short-to-
medium term, the effectiveness and political acceptability
of other regulatory options should be researched and
assessed.
The presently established regulatory framework ushered
in by the UNESCO Convention might be characterized as
a system of command-and-control regulation incorporating
legal and ethical disincentives to crime (Baldwin, Cave, and
Lodge 2010, 8–9). First, as is the norm in the criminal justice
system generally, this system attempts to deter criminal and
otherwise illicit activity by diminishing incentives through
punitive sanctions for those caught engaging in theft and illi-
cit trade. Energetic law enforcement in places like Italy (Som-
ers Cocks 2018), Spain (Muñoz and Morcillo 2018a, 2018b),
and New York (SDNY 2020) has certainly been effective. But
in too many market countries, the threat posed to lawbreak-
ing traders by punitive sanctions is known to be minimal. It
does not pose a realistic deterrent because of the jurisdic-
tional gaps and fractures that impede international action.
The international policy response is to call upon national
governments to increase law enforcement capacity. But
again, such initiatives are opposed by the art dealing lobby,
particularly in the absence of any reliable assessments of
the size and harmfulness of the trade. The supporting strat-
egy has been to encourage trade self-regulation through the
development of ethical codes of conduct, which does enjoy
6 N. BRODIE ET AL.
the endorsement of the art dealing lobby, though the evi-
dence shows such codes to be often opaque and ineffectual
(Mackenzie et al. 2020, 118–121). Guidelines are vague,
and there is no external oversight. There are many documen-
ted infractions, though there do not appear to be any attend-
ant penalties (e.g. Tsirogiannis 2020).
In the years since 1970, many innovative, non-legislative
schemes for controlling socially or environmentally harmful
trades and hazardous businesses have been introduced which
are not and could not have been included in the regulatory
vision set out by the UNESCO Convention. Since then, a
more nuanced body of regulatory theory and practice has
developed, incorporating social and economic strategies of
crime control that address the market dynamics underpin-
ning illicit trade, treating people as responsible citizens to
be “steered” rather than as criminal offenders to be alienated.
They include strategies encouraging good behavior, as well as
discouraging harmful acts. Persuasion and negotiation might
have a greater pragmatic deterrent effect than the minimal
threat of punishment (see Figure 4; Ayres and Braithwaite
1992; Mackenzie 2005; Jennings and Rand 2008; Baldwin,
Cave, and Lodge 2010). And when we refer here to persua-
sion, we are not simply advocating for more awareness-rais-
ing or ethical guidance. Rather, we are seeking to explore
stronger regulatory systems aimed at reducing demand for
illicit objects by encouraging or rewarding responsible col-
lecting and trading. One way forward might be to explore
the possibilities of an externally monitored, ethical consump-
tion market (Mackenzie et al. 2020, 122–126). Developing
the Good Collector concept (McIntosh, Togola, and McIn-
tosh 1995), Kersel (2021) recently articulated a set of criteria
for Smart(er) Collectors: more responsible individuals and
institutions who note red flags, ask questions about owner-
ship history, check relevant databases, report anything suspi-
cious, return artifacts, and contact representatives of
museums and ministries of culture in the country of origin
about any potential purchases. It has been suggested that
UNESCO should develop such innovative means of regu-
lation and adopt a role as external monitor (Prott 2012, 8),
though there has been no discernible progress in that
direction.
There is fertile ground here for comparative research into
other illicit trades or harmful enterprises that might suggest
policy options complementary to those already in place (e.g.
Mackenzie 2015; Mackenzie and Yates 2016). Again, this
work needs to be interdisciplinary and conducted by individ-
uals, or preferably teams, possessing a good, in-depth under-
standing of the trade in cultural objects as it currently exists,
together, as appropriate, with knowledge of comparative
trades or businesses. We should emphasize once again that
in calling for the development and application of novel regu-
latory solutions, we are not arguing for the disregard of
established governing regimes, nor that efforts to achieve
more rigorous and harmonized implementations of national
and international law should be abandoned. Far from it. We
are suggesting short-to-medium term additions to the long-
term and perhaps even unattainable policy goals of legal har-
monization and enhanced law enforcement.
Gaps and Shortfalls in Expectations
We know from formal interviews and informal conversa-
tions, research, and personal experience that, as well as
providing assessments of the nature and scale of the trade
and the damage it causes, IGOs, INGOs, and some (but
not all) law enforcement agencies would like scholars to
monitor the market for illicitly traded objects. These agencies
report that this expectation is rarely achieved. Most univer-
sity-based archaeologists and anthropologists do not moni-
tor the market for illicitly traded objects, whether it is
because they do not have the time, they do not consider it
to be part of their job, or they do not know how. University
employees are paid to teach and/or to carry out research and
are not rewarded with tenure, promotion, or funding for
monitoring the market during work time unless it contrib-
utes directly to contractual obligations. The alternative, and
often the expectation, is that academics should conduct
this work in the evenings or weekends after work, offering
their services free of charge out of altruistic love for their
subject matter. Some do exactly that and receive little aca-
demic credit in return. We think the expectation of unpaid
scholarly labor is not much more than a cheap performative
policy ploy, offering the appearance of action while failing to
fund and develop something more substantial, sustainable,
and effective. In any case, monitoring the market is not as
easy as it might appear. It does not take long to find suspi-
cious-looking objects for sale on the internet and to notify
the police, but the police are unlikely to act unless there is
strong evidence of wrongdoing, which is much more difficult
to obtain. Researchers must have the expertise to recognize
objects with a high probability of having been recently traded
illegally, to understand what kind of evidence is necessary to
enable police action, and to know how to obtain it. This is a
unique combination of expertise not typically available
within the scholarly community, and to act without it runs
the risk of wasting police time.
It is also important to recognize that university-based
research is constrained by ethical and legal requirements to
“do no harm” (AAA 2012). We say that because we believe
there is an emerging opinion among IGOs and INGOs that
market monitoring should be used for unravelling trafficking
networks and identifying criminals; to function, in fact, as
surrogate police work. Such work is invaluable in several
contexts, and not only when the request comes from a
country whose heritage is at risk. But when this type of
activity is conducted in university settings, it is subject to
human rights, privacy, and data-sharing laws and broader
ethical injunctions about the protection of research subjects.
Researcher openness and research subject anonymity are
key. Article 17(b) of the American Society of Criminology
(ASC) Code of Ethics, for example, proscribes undercover
or other deceptive methods of research when it requires
that researchers “do not mislead respondents to purposes
for which research is being conducted” (ASC n.d.). Article
18 of the same code requires that “ASC members do not
use their positions as professionals, researchers or faculty,
as a pretext for gathering intelligence for any organizations
(including consulting firms and non-profit groups) or gov-
ernments” (ASC n.d.). Compiling and sharing evidence
about criminal actions with organizations and governments,
including law enforcement agencies, can have real, iniqui-
tous consequences. In some jurisdictions, due process and
a fair trial cannot be guaranteed. Nor can fair sentencing
be assumed for convicted offenders. It was reported from
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, for example, that in 1998, six people
were executed for stealing the head of an Assyrian winged
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bull from Khorsabad (Crossette 1998). At the time, it was
believed that Saddam’s brother-in-law Arshad Yashin was
centrally involved in the smuggling of antiquities out of
Iraq, before being told to desist by Saddam (Sandler 2004).
He is presently believed to be alive and well in Qatar. In
authoritarian regimes, justice is a malleable concept, often
protecting the powerful and victimizing the weak. Infor-
mation sharing with law enforcement agencies cannot be
countenanced in such circumstances.
Having said all that, we commonly do report sightings of
illicitly traded objects on the market, often raising prove-
nance issues (e.g. Brodie 2020b; Yates 2020). These reports
may assist in the recovery of stolen objects but might also
attract the attention of law enforcement and further their
criminal investigations. Is there an ethical line to be drawn
between the long-accepted academic practice of provenance
research, which almost by definition depends upon personal
identifications, and the publication of personal information
about suspect actors or known criminals? Where exactly
that dividing line should be drawn remains to be established.
Given the increasing internet availability of open-source
intelligence (OSINT) and accessibility of Deepnet sites, con-
cerns about the ethical propriety of deceptive or undercover
research and the nature of information sharing will only
become more acute. There are crosscutting legal and ethical
issues here that we cannot adequately address in this paper
but which certainly warrant discussion and resolution for
any prospective or established university-based market
monitoring schemes. But for the time being, it is enough
to know that understanding why and how a crime is com-
mitted, the nature and harmful consequences of that crime,
and how regulatory interventions might reduce crime, can
be of far more critical benefit to policy development, and
thus diminishment of illicit trade, than working with law
enforcement to apprehend a limited number of criminals.
Gaps and Shortfalls in Communication and
Information Sharing
Two of us (Brodie and Yates) were among the authors of a
recent European Commission (EC) report on the illicit
trade in cultural objects (Brodie et al. 2019). While preparing
the report, we struggled to access any reliable information
concerning the trade, either through literature review or sta-
keholder survey and interview. There was a dearth of trust-
worthy evidence for answering even basic questions about
the size of the trade. In the report, we explored reasons
why such information is not available, concluding that
ineffective data collection by law enforcement and criminal
justice agencies, poor intra- and inter-agency collaboration,
and poor information sharing between those agencies and
the public comprise some roots of the problem. In our intro-
duction to this paper, for example, we noted 213 arrests
made during three international Pandora operations, yet
we struggled to find any follow-up reporting. Were the
arrested people convicted or allowed to go free? How were
they moving and marketing material? What were the finan-
cial arrangements? We have no answers to any of those ques-
tions. Similarly, while sometimes the return of confiscated
objects is legally mandated, often it is the result of diplomatic
and other behind-the-scenes negotiations which obscure
rather than make transparent the criminal activities under-
writing their illicit trade (see Luke and Kersel 2013 for a dis-
cussion of objects as agents of diplomacy). In this context,
Figure 4. The regulatory gap between law and ethics.
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the actions of New York authorities in making publicly avail-
able the detailed documentation of their arrest and seizure
warrants shine out like transformative beams of illuminating
light (e.g. New York 2019). We wish other agencies would
follow their example.
Aimed primarily at criminal justice and law enforcement,
the EC report also identified problems of communication
and information sharing within academia. A good infor-
mation source may be crucial to a scholar’s research, repu-
tation, and employability and will be closely guarded in
consequence. Collegial researchers who are interested in
this topic and willing to share information are physically dis-
persed or face institutional barriers to ongoing digital collab-
oration, particularly when such work is not the primary focus
of their academic job. Research is generally presented at one-
off conferences and workshops and published in academic
journals or edited volumes, where it fails to reach researchers
in other disciplines or policy makers who could benefit from
it. It is scattered among book chapters and non-open-access
academic journal papers, typically written in English. It is
housed on poorly maintained websites and on academics’
hard drives at unconnected institutions around the world.
It suffers from not being linked together in any meaningful
way to enable a local, regional, or global understanding of
this issue. There is no central repository of information
accessible to other researchers, law enforcement, local gov-
ernments, etc. Meanwhile, this information is aging. Data-
bases and websites are not maintained; they are falling out
of date, and updates are both logistically and financially
impossible. With limited access to this material, policy
makers and their bought-in researchers fall back on media
reporting and open-access or OSINT materials, which, by
excluding what might be good though not easily accessible
information, cannot in themselves provide a complete view
of the problem.
IGOs and INGOs are not exempt from this criticism. We
have experienced what could be called claim-staking or ter-
ritoriality among IGOs and INGOs that are ostensibly con-
cerned with deciding or guiding policy but which appear
to be more interested in protecting their own perceived man-
dates or attracting funding to support their ongoing activi-
ties. This is understandable, as we are all vying for
financial support of our work. Certain IGOs and INGOs
assert competence and authority in trade-related issues
within the public and policy spheres, claiming that other sta-
keholder groups should accept their policy guidance or be
excluded from the policy-making process. In our experience,
the competence of an IGO or INGO reflects the competence
of its individual officers, which sometimes is excellent but
other times falls short. Some of these IGOs and INGOs
seem to view other stakeholder groups more as competitors
than as colleagues, sometimes siloing information from each
other and from other stakeholders to the detriment of collab-
oration and innovation. Meanwhile, their claims to “know
best” can act to divert funding away from the type of research
initiatives that could improve the policy landscape.
Due to poor communication, we see projects continually
re-inventing the wheel: they spend time and money asking
the same questions, developing the same methods, chasing
the same information, conducting the same analyses, and
producing the same conclusions as previous or parallel pro-
jects. It encourages the policy path dependency we identified
earlier and wastes time and money. The general lack of good
quality data sources discourages researchers from entering
the field in the first place, and, inasmuch as research follows
information, research questions come to be structured
around what information is available, an exercise in what
is achievable rather than what is needed or would be most
productive and useful.
Gaps and Shortfalls in Funding
Current funding models supporting research into the illicit
trade in cultural objects are woefully inadequate in terms
both of accessibility and sustainability. Generally speaking,
we see funding to be channeled through two types of
agencies: what we characterize as academic-sector agencies
(e.g. European Research Council [ERC] and National
Endowment for the Humanities), with funding directed
towards research in universities and comparable institutions
of higher learning, and humanitarian agencies (e.g. ALIPH
and the UK’s Cultural Protection Fund), with funding
directed towards practical action aimed at public education,
training, technical development or assessment, networking,
etc. Academic-sector agencies do not fund applied research
of the type that we believe is needed and are advocating
here. Humanitarian agencies rarely fund research of any
sort. Neither type of agency is a source of sustainable
funding.
Competitive funding offered by academic-sector agencies
generally requires research projects to possess a sophisticated
theoretical framework or to be methodologically innovative
—what the ERC, for example, terms “frontier research.” In
our experience, it is rare that an academic funding body
will support what it would consider to be applied research
aimed at answering simple questions about the trade in cul-
tural objects unless it is embedded within a larger project
aimed at producing novel understandings of the problem
or innovative solutions. Several of the quantitative assess-
ments we referenced earlier, for example, were conducted
as exercises demonstrating the methodological utility of a
novel algorithm or technology that was not then deployed
for further applied research. The funding was to support
the development of the methodology, not to investigate a
real-world problem. Applied research of the type needed is
generally poorly regarded in universities (Brodie 2018,
726–728).
By and large, humanitarian agencies do not believe it to be
within their remit to fund primary research. We believe this
to be short-sighted. Without a secure understanding of pro-
blems and solutions obtained through research, these
agencies cannot guarantee or even judge the suitability or
success of projects they do fund. There is surely room here
for hybrid projects incorporating research as a component
of practical action, perhaps through the agency of civil
society NGOs. We believe the failure to countenance such
projects is a missed opportunity.
Particularly in the case of funding from academic-sector
agencies, true and meaningful research collaboration with
local in-country experts and authorities is either not
required, is indirectly discouraged, or is rendered impossible
by the intricacies of grant awarding and payment conditions.
As we have already observed, there remains a strong sense
that research is conducted “on” people from countries
where illicit cultural objects originate, not “with” them.
Although grantees usually must display some commitment
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to “knowledge sharing,” this rarely involves knowledge co-
creation and usually takes the form of one-off training exer-
cises or the equivalent. Researchers who do wish to include
meaningful and equitable local collaborations in their
research are often prevented from doing so by barriers to
paying salaries to experts working outside of European and
North American institutions or by local payment processes
and informal economies that do not conform to the needs
of European/North American financial accounting pro-
cedures. Funding bodies that do require local collaboration
often accept token representation rather than requiring
strong evidence of meaningful partnership. Humanitarian
agencies are more proactive in fostering meaningful partner-
ships, but they do not fund research. They are also likely to
respond to immediate heritage crises, with limited consider-
ation of the sustainability of the work supported and cross-
cultural applicability of any data that is gathered. Altogether,
the situation is nothing short of disastrous. Local in-country
universities and NGOs can conduct crucial research (Cun-
liffe 2016; Sabrine and Cunliffe forthcoming), but the necess-
ary funding is either not structured appropriately or is not
available.
The short-termism of much research funding is another
problem. Researchers sometimes secure competitive fund-
ing, but for discretely defined “frontier” projects that do
not always address the current concerns or requirements
of policy makers. These projects generate a short burst of
activity, training students and new researchers and devel-
oping research capacity, but then fade away once the fund-
ing expires. Training and then dismissing and dispersing
researchers is not how research capacity is built. Most
major funders explicitly decline to consider applications
for follow-on funding other than for specific spinning-off
activities in relation to the key findings of the main funded
program of research, such as a brief burst of post-project
impact work. Rather than fund what they consider to be
more of the same, most large funders view their first invest-
ment in a project team to be also their last, hoping that
they are pump-priming a program of activity that will
prove successful and somehow sustainable. Unfortunately,
this amounts to structural obsolescence for most research
teams. This is demonstrated by the fact that the majority
of funded projects end after their fixed term of initial fund-
ing runs out, with the temporarily employed researchers
heading off to other jobs while the permanent staff turn
their focus to other projects that hold prospects of new
funding income streams. Funding models should be
reconfigured to include money aimed at supporting the
implementation of the results of the originally supported
research. Even where scholars with a personal research
interest in the trade in cultural objects and who have per-
manent or faculty positions do exist, they are not replaced
by similarly interested scholars upon retirement. There is
no continuity of expertise, resulting in very little insti-
tutional memory on which to build. The information
decay due to deteriorating websites and databases we
noted in the previous section is also attributable to the
expiration of time-limited funding that enabled their con-
struction in the first place.
We are yet to see the development of a critical mass of
experienced and active researchers who are ready and able
to conduct good quality research. And this is not a trivial
problem. There are serious methodological, logistical, and
ethical difficulties in conducting empirical research into the
illicit trade in cultural objects (Mackenzie 2019). Information
is scattered, inaccessible, and often risky to obtain. Risks
range from threats of physical violence through to legal
action. Intimidation is a feature of the field and can act to
misdirect or dilute research. When combined with the pro-
blems of information siloing and decay already discussed,
there is an inducement for inexperienced researchers to
veer off into safer channels of research and to avoid what
in policy terms might be more productive and desirable pos-
sibilities. We note the increasing, and to our minds regret-
table, tendency for insufficiently supervised early career
researchers to circulate questionnaires canvassing the
opinions of more experienced researchers, a practice which
flirts dangerously close to plagiarism and is often ethically
insecure, calling into question the competence of erstwhile
supervisors. It is not useable research.
These problems are not insuperable. Research into illicit
markets more generally faces a similar set of discouraging
obstacles, but methodologies and techniques have been
devised to overcome them. Experienced researchers can pro-
vide advice and mentoring. Unfortunately, in the context of
time-limited projects, the necessary experience is not always
on hand. Even when targeted funding is made available for
projects to answer specific questions about the trade, there
are not enough suitably experienced researchers to answer
the call. The funding then gravitates towards organizations,
particularly private-sector ones, with the competence necess-
ary to conduct basic research through accessing media
reports and open-access materials. As we have noted, that
type of research is unlikely to increase specialized research
capacity or to break new ground or suggest anything innova-
tive. Once more, there is the ever-present danger of reinvent-
ing the wheel that will convey us further down the same old
policy path.
Closing (Some of) the Gaps: A Permanent
Research Group
We have described what we see to be a series of gaps and
shortfalls in current policy and policy making. A potential
solution may be the creation of one or more permanently
established collaborative groups conducting theoretically
informed, evidence-based research into the trade in cultural
objects that would provide the ongoing platform needed to
close these gaps and make up shortfalls. Such a group or
groups would provide governments, INGOs, and IGOs
with the knowledge and understandings necessary to develop
and implement more effective policy. The group or groups
would ideally be distributed among one or more universities
or equivalent research institutions around the world and
spread across different disciplines and would include in-
country co-creators. The group or groups would serve to
consolidate expertise on this topic and would: conduct
research into the trade in cultural objects and its regulation;
be available to answer specific calls for research, advice, or
information from policy makers; develop sustainable strat-
egies of collaboration and coordination between different
groups of stakeholders (including the private sector,
NGOs, and other civil society actors); develop sustainable
and equitable working relationships with in-country
researchers and other interested stakeholders (including
NGOs and other civil society actors); promote information
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gathering and exchange by developing institutional reposi-
tories, including sustainable databases and websites; build
research capacity through teaching and training (including
expert supervision and mentoring for postgraduate stu-
dents); develop ethically justifiable programs of market
monitoring; and, attract further financial support for the
above-listed activities.
To support the establishment and ongoing work of such a
group or groups, we need a sustainable strategy of resource
allocation to end the short-termism of time-limited, some-
times reactive project funding. This statement may appear
to be special pleading, in that all research scholars are oper-
ating within the same competitive funding environments.
But we are not asking for additional funding to be made
available. Funding for research into the trade is not always
wisely distributed, and it could be utilized more effectively.
We have witnessed literally tens-of-millions of pounds/dol-
lars/euros poured into projects ostensibly aimed at diminish-
ing the illicit trade in cultural objects; targeted and short-
term funding that we believe has not always produced useful
results. These sums of money are of a magnitude far surpass-
ing anything being directed towards the subject matter of
many other disciplines. We suggest that some of the current
funding for time-limited projects should be used instead for
the endowment of permanent positions or institutions that
can then act over the long-term to anchor and provide sus-
tainability for the broader group(s) and to guarantee the
necessary institutional support. Though most of us are
affiliated to the Trafficking Culture research consortium
(Trafficking Culture n.d., https://traffickingculture.org/),
working together with Heritage for Peace (Heritage for
Peace n.d., https://www.heritageforpeace.org/), we make no
prior claim to be that group, or even part of it. Our call is
for the creation and reliable funding of a research architec-
ture more rooted in stability and sustainability than current
arrangements allow. We are making the case here for a col-
laborative academic center of gravity, not for any particular
people to be involved.
The primary research agenda of such a group would be
interdisciplinary and comparative, global in scope, drawing
upon research conducted into other illicit trades and hazar-
dous businesses, and promoting engagement with new com-
petency areas, both inside and outside academia. The most
obvious disciplinary starting points for the group(s) would
reflect those represented by the authors of this paper and
by other scholars we are aware of in law, archaeology/anthro-
pology, sociology, and criminology. As we have argued,
though, other disciplines would need to be involved, such
as economics, organizational studies, political science, inter-
national relations, etc.
Sharp-eyed readers will notice the inclusion of the ILLI-
CID Project on the UNESCO diagram of international col-
laboration reproduced as Figure 2. This inclusion confirms
our criticism of time-limited project funding. The ILLICID
Project ran from 2015–2019 to assess the size of the illicit
trade in cultural objects through Germany. Its final report
was published (Hemeier and Hilgert 2019), and then the pro-
ject was disbanded. In August 2021, as this paper was going
to press, the German government announced the three-year
follow-up NEXUD Project (Hickley 2021). The announce-
ment came a few months after the more dispiriting February
2021 announcement that the Circulating Artefacts (CircArt)
project at the British Museum had also ended. One project
ends and another starts up. We hope the NEXUD Project
leads to something more permanent, though we are not opti-
mistic. But by including the ILLICID Project in its inter-
national collaboration, UNESCO demonstrates its desire to
establish credible research partnerships. Various UNESCO
publications back through time list other research partners
that have also faded from view as funding has expired (e.g.
Torggler et al. 2014, 80; UNESCO n.d). In 1997, Patrick
O’Keefe argued similarly for the need of what he termed a
“resource center” (O’Keefe 1997, 104–105), but nothing
much has happened since then. UNESCO can only partner
with what is available, and we confidently expect that
UNESCO would welcome a permanently established and
internationally recognized research group into its policy-
making family.
It is now 50 years since the adoption of the UNESCO
Convention, and regardless of international policy develop-
ment since then, the illicit trade in cultural objects endures.
We still lack the basic understandings needed to craft an
effective policy response. To some extent, new public policy
that is being developed and implemented may be focused on
the wrong problem (due to an anachronistic understanding
of the trade) and applying the incorrect solution (due to a
poor understanding of regulatory options). One or more per-
manently established interdisciplinary research groups com-
mitted to local inclusion and collaboration would help
prevent another 50 years of disarticulated research, short-
term projects, information siloing, and poor research
capacity building and go some way towards making good
the consequent policy gaps and shortfalls we have identified.
We are not so naïve as to suppose such a research group
would eradicate illicit trade. No doubt one of its first rec-
ommendations would be for the establishment of a parallel
and perhaps interacting international law enforcement
grouping, perhaps building on and structured around the
work of Interpol. But fifty years on from the UNESCO Con-
vention, in policy terms, we do not just need more of the
same. It is high time we started thinking about something
new and more effective for tackling the illicit trade in cultural
objects.
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